THREAT MODELS / AI AGENT SECURITY

The prompt looks safe. What happens next?

Agent risk lives in tools, memory, permissions and hand-offs. Ackuity checks every action against 60+ threat models in 14 categories, mapped to NIST, OWASP and MITRE ATLAS.

THE AUTHORIZED TASK

Prepare the vendor renewal summary.

Read contracts · Compare renewal dates
THE PROPOSED ACTION

Assume finance-admin.

Outside task scope → Constrain
INTENT ≠ PERMISSIONILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO

14 THREAT CATEGORIES

Every category, in plain English.

Each category lists example threat models. Ackuity weighs every action against the security context graph for AI agents built for it.

01 / 14

A2A threats

One agent tricks, impersonates or colludes with another, and bad instructions spread from agent to agent.

  • Interagent authentication exploits
  • Agent trust exploitation
  • Collaborative decision manipulation
  • A2A collusion attacks
  • A2A misinformation cascading
  • Rogue agents
02 / 14

Memory poisoning

An attacker plants false information in what the agent remembers or retrieves, so its later actions go wrong.

  • System memory poisoning
  • Vector DB poisoning
  • Object DB poisoning
  • Database poisoning
03 / 14

Misaligned and deceptive behaviour

The agent chases something other than its assigned goal, or only pretends to follow its rules.

  • Threat alignment
  • Alignment faking
  • Excessive agency
04 / 14

Privilege compromise

The agent uses more access than the task needs, or gets tricked into using its access on someone else's behalf.

  • Excessive permissions
  • Confused deputy
  • Overprovisioned agents
  • OAuth scope violation
05 / 14

Remote code execution

The agent writes or runs code, queries or API calls that carry an attack.

  • Malicious code generation
  • SQL injection
  • Malicious prompt generation
  • API attacks
06 / 14

Identity spoofing and impersonation

A user or an agent passes itself off as someone it is not.

  • User impersonation
  • Agent impersonation
  • Behavioural mimicry
  • Weak authentication
07 / 14

Agent social engineering

The agent manipulates the people it works with, or hides what it is doing from them.

  • Manipulate users
  • Covert actions
08 / 14

Resource overload

The agent burns through compute, API quotas or time, by accident or by design.

  • Reflection loop trap
  • API quota depletion
  • Computational resource exhaustion
09 / 14

Sensitive and regulated data exposure

The agent sends personal, health, confidential or proprietary data somewhere it should not go.

  • PII data exposure
  • PHI data exposure
  • Intellectual property exposure
  • Confidential data exposure
10 / 14

Tool misuse

The agent runs a risky command, uses a poisoned or compromised tool, or chains safe tools into an unsafe result.

  • Risky commands
  • Risky plugins
  • Tool poisoning
  • Supply chain attack
  • Risky tool chaining
11 / 14

Intent breaking and goal manipulation

Injected instructions pull the agent away from the task the user actually asked for.

  • Direct prompt injection
  • Indirect prompt injection
  • Meta-learning vulnerability injection
  • Prompt extraction
  • XPIA
12 / 14

Overwhelming human in the loop

The agent floods or misleads the people meant to review it, so bad actions get approved.

  • Trust mechanism subversion
  • Cognitive overload
  • Human intervention interface manipulation
13 / 14

MCP threats

A Model Context Protocol server or its configuration is hijacked, poisoned or set up insecurely.

  • OAuth misconfiguration
  • Prompt poisoning
  • Server hijacking
14 / 14

Policy violations

The agent breaks a data access or handling rule your organization has set.

  • Overshared data access
  • ABAC violation
  • Reclassification of sensitive documents

FOUR PATTERNS WORTH RECOGNIZING

Follow the action. Find the missing context.

Each starts with a reasonable request. The threat shows up only when you connect the action to the task, the authority and the history.

01 / ACTION CHAINS

A valid tool call can be part of an invalid sequence.

An agent reads contracts, assumes a finance-admin role and attempts a payment. Each operation has to be judged against the original task.

Task intent + action historySee action chain exploitation

02 / SCOPE

Access is not the same as authorization.

An agent can retrieve a document, but the intended recipient may be outside the permitted scope.

Identity + data policy + recipientSee contextual scope bypass

03 / MEMORY

The risk can arrive before the action.

A changed memory or retrieved instruction can quietly redirect later work. The final call may look routine in isolation.

Memory + provenance + prior behaviorSee slow state corruption

04 / DELEGATION

Authority can get lost in the handoff.

A downstream agent treats another agent’s request as permission to act. The original user never granted that scope.

Delegation chain + original authoritySee inter-agent exploitation

ACKUITY RESEARCH

A taxonomy of threats to AI agents.

Four broad classes. 21 threat vectors.

BRING A FRAMEWORK TO YOUR SECURITY REVIEW

Make the threat model concrete.

Use our research to structure your assessment. The 14 categories above extend it with our newer threat models.

Read the research
See how Ackuity decides

PUT CONTEXT TO THE TEST

Allow it, ask a human, or block it?

Try three illustrative agent-action scenarios. Find the context that changes the decision.

Take the challenge

YOUR QUESTIONS, ANSWERED

Before you take the next step.

What are the main security risks for AI agents?

AI agent risks include prompt injection, unsafe tool use, memory poisoning, privilege misuse, sensitive data exposure and compromised delegation. Assessing them requires looking at the agent’s permissions, connected systems and sequence of actions, as well as its inputs.

Why can a safe prompt still lead to an unsafe action?

A prompt can be legitimate while a later action exceeds the task’s scope. For example, preparing a finance summary does not authorize a role change or payment. The relevant checks include intent, identity, permissions and earlier actions.

How many threat models does Ackuity check?

Ackuity checks each agent action against 60+ threat models in 14 categories, mapped to NIST, OWASP and MITRE ATLAS. The mapping supports your security review. It is not a certification.

Can an MCP gateway stop agent attacks?

Only the ones that pass through it. An MCP gateway governs the calls routed to it, but agents also act through CLI commands, SQL, raw HTTP, memory writes and agent-to-agent hand-offs that never reach it. Ackuity checks those actions too, and can pass the context it builds back to the gateway.

Does every listed threat get blocked automatically?

No. The response depends on severity, confidence, your policy and how Ackuity is deployed. Observe-only event pull reports findings without stopping anything. The sidecar can constrain, block or send an action to a person before it runs.

NEXT STEP

Find the risks in your agent environment.

Start with read-only discovery. Leave with findings your engineering and security teams can act on.

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